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Abstract
Modern computing applications require highly reliable software systems, but current validation techniques, like
testing, fail to assure an adequate level of correctness. We present a model checking procedure to verify a subset of
the Java virtual machine language (JVML) with respect to properties expressed by a temporal logic.A tableau-based
method is developed to prove the satisfaction of a formula: by this local approach a program computation is checked
only if involved in the goal of the property veriﬁcation. A special symbol ⊥ is introduced to represent “unknown’’
values, and computations are performed in a symbolic way exploiting the set of guards present in the formulae to
reﬁne possible unknown values. This kind of abstraction cuts the state explosion of the programs and it is applicable
to check arbitrary formulae, but the result of the veriﬁcation has an imprecision degree depending on the number
of unknown values manipulated during each symbolic computation.
© 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Veriﬁcation techniques are usually applied to speciﬁcation languages, like CCS [25] and LOTOS [4],
for the simplicity of their semantics, while testing is used for sequential or concurrent programming
languages. Nevertheless, since modern computing applications require highly reliable software systems,
and such systems have increasingly high size and complexity, testing fails to assure an adequate level of
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correctness. Formal veriﬁcation techniques might be a better choice, and, in particular, model checking
methods seem promising, since they automatically establish properties of complex systems (well-known
model checkers are [10,20,24]), nevertheless, several problems occur when employing formal techniques.
The ﬁrst problem concerns the process of deriving a model of the system behavior: this process is error
prone if not performed automatically; moreover, when the states of the model are too many (or inﬁnite),
their number has to be cut, for example, through abstraction techniques. A further problem is to decide
whether software system descriptions have to be translated to the input languages of existing veriﬁcation
tools or a custom-made veriﬁcation environment has to be developed. The last problem to be considered is
bound to the efﬁciency of the veriﬁcation procedure, in fact, actual program execution should be avoided:
When the language to be veriﬁed has a limited set of features, for example it is lacking of recursion and
dynamic allocation, and has simple loop control conditions, a kind of symbolic execution can be used.
Despite the problems above, in the last years software model checking has attracted many researchers,
in particular, several different ways have been followed to approach the problem of model checking Java
programs, (on this topic see [1,2,12,32]).
In this paper, we propose a temporal logic that resembles action logics, like mu-calculus [3,30], but
where each action is a generalization of sets of program instructions and is “guarded’’ by a constraint
stated on the values of the local variables or on the top value of the operand stack. Thus, while keeping
the simplicity of the mu-calculus temporal operators, the logic gains a better view on the machine status
by stating assertions on the values produced by the programs. This logic suits the characteristics of stack-
based assembly languages and we use, as an example of application of the model checking methodology,
the sub-set of the Java virtual machine language (JVML) [23,29] that operates on an operand stack and
a memory of local variables by means of arithmetic instructions and conditional/unconditional jumps.
Finally, a temporal model checking methodology is presented, which is formally deﬁned and which can
be easily automatized. Property veriﬁcation is performed on models representing both the control ﬂow
of the programs and the possible evolution of the state of the execution environment consisting of the
possible states of the local variables and of the operand stack, which are deﬁned in terms of values and
guards. A single distinct value, called ⊥ is used to avoid the representation of each possible compatible
value when variables and stack elements hold “unknown values’’. The meaning of ⊥ is reﬁned during a
kind of symbolic execution of the program by the associated conjunction of guards that keep the history
of the execution with regard to the part of formula until now evaluated to true. This fact realizes an
abstraction on the values managed by the program that is formula-driven. Only a partial state space of the
program is model checked, but the veriﬁcation produces in any case a two-valued result. Note that, if the
veriﬁcation result is “true’’ on the partial state, this fact implies that the result is “true’’ on the complete
space too, but, when the result is “false’’, it can be “true’’ or “false’’ on the complete space. Thus we use
a two-valued logic with a pessimistic interpretation [6,7] instead of using a three-valued logic with an
explicit treatment of the “unknown’’ results; the precision degree of the result depends on the precision
of the guards associated with the formula actions, and the approach permits to check arbitrary formulae,
not just universal properties.
In our approach, the model checker procedure is implemented by a tableau system that automatizes
it (see also [27,28]); this method allows the model checking of only that part of the system involved
in (local to) the property to be veriﬁed. However, the property veriﬁcation can be divided in two parts:
the ﬁrst part refers to the veriﬁcation of the action occurrences, and resembles existing model checking
methods [9,31]; the second part concerns the guard veriﬁcation and is newly designed, but some existing
environment can be exploited (see, for example, [8]).
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In Section 2 the instructions of JVML are recalled and the semantic rules are deﬁned by which the
program control-ﬂow graph can be constructed; moreover, the temporal logic called guarded action logic
(GAL for short) is presented. The successive section presents the program model, while Section 4 deﬁnes
when aGAL formula is satisﬁed by a program. The correctness of the approach is proved in the appendix,
while Section 5 presents the model checking procedure and the appendix also concludes and compares
this approach with some related ones.
2. The programming language and the temporal logic
This section presents both the stack-based machine language and the temporal logic used to express
correctness (or security, or other) requirements for a program.
2.1. The language
We consider the sub-set of JVML [23,29] shown in Table 1, where x is a local variable, k is a
constant, and op is a binary arithmetic operation (for example, add, sub). Instructions operate on the
local variables and the operand stack by means of arithmetic instructions and conditional/unconditional
jumps, some of which supporting subroutine calls (i.e. the pair jsr, ret) to manage exceptions. We
assume that the instructions representing subroutine calls have a well-structured behavior, since they
derive from the compilation of higher level JAVA constructs, like the statement try-finally, and
an instruction store x is always the ﬁrst instruction of the subroutine body; we furtherly assume that
recursion is not present.
2.2. The temporal logic
GAL rephrases themu-calculus [30] in a context inwhich the actions have a differentmeaning, bound to
a general machine language level, but not closely related to the syntax of a particular language (JVML, for
example). Each action is not necessarily put in a one-to-one correspondencewith the program instructions,
but a generalization can be made with respect to some common characteristics of a set of instructions, for
example, all instructions canceling an element from the operand stack, or pushing an element onto the
operand stack, or reading (modifying) a local variable. Each action is “guarded’’ by a constraint stated on
the value of a local variable or of the top element in the stack: only the occurrences of the action when the
guard is satisﬁed are of interest. In the following section, we will formally specify the correspondence
we use between instructions of JVML (actually transitions of the control-ﬂow graph of a program) and
an action of a GAL formula.
The syntax of GAL is the following, where x is a variable name, k a constant,  a distinct variable
name that represents the top element of the stack, and null a distinct constant to represent the empty
top element:
 ::= tt | ff |  ∧  |  ∨  | Z. | Z. | [, guard]  | 〈, guard〉
 ::= use(x) | mod(x) | popstack | pushstack | instr
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Table 1
Instruction set
op pop two operands off the stack, perform the operation,
and push the result onto the stack
pop discard the top value from the stack
push k push the constant k onto the stack
load x push the value of the variable x onto the stack
store x pop the top element off the stack and store its value into variable x
if j pop the top element off the stack and jump to j if its value is
different from zero
goto j jump to j
jsr j if at address r , jump to j and push r + 1 onto the stack
ret x jump to the address stored in the variable x
halt stop
guard ::= x rop k |  rop k |  = null | ¬guard
instr ::= (sub-)set of the language instructions
rop ::= < | > |  |  | = | =
An occurrence of Z is called free if it is not within the scope of a binder Z (Z): Z (Z) binds the
free occurrences of Z in , obtaining closed formulae. From now on, we consider only closed ﬁxed point
formulae formulae, where Z. is the least ﬁx-point of the recursive equation Z = , and Z. is the
greatest one.
mod(x) is the action of modifying the local variable x; use(x) is the action of using x without
modiﬁcations; popstack the action of canceling values from the stack; pushstack the action of
pushing a value onto the stack. instr represents actions directly corresponding to instructions of the
language: when used, this option allows a better view of the particular language or program at hand; for
example, there are instructions that neither use nor modify a variable.
A GAL formula has the following intuitive meaning:
• [, g]  requires that  is satisﬁed after the occurrence of each action  with the guard g fulﬁlled;
• 〈, g〉 requires that at least an action  with the guard g fulﬁlled can occur, afterwards  must be
satisﬁed.








where i is any action different from . [−(, g)]  (〈−(, g)〉) means that, when g is fulﬁlled, any
action different from  has to be considered, while the occurrence of  is forbidden, otherwise only the
occurrence of  is permitted.
Given a guard g,var(g) =
{
x if g = (x rop k) or g = ¬(x rop k),
nil otherwise,
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i.e., var(g) either returns the name of the local variable involved in the guard, or nil, when the guard
concerns the top element of the stack.
2.3. An example: the program Pnm
Given two natural numbers, m and n, the following program Pnm computes nm:
1: push 1; 8: mult;
2: store r; 9: store r;
3: load n; 10: push 1;
4: load m; 11: load m;
5: if 7; 12: sub;
6: halt; 13: store m;
7: load r; 14: goto 3;
Some GAL formulae of interest for Pnm are:
1 = Z.[halt, m = 0]ff ∧ [- halt, m = 0]Z.
1 means that the termination of the program cannot occur when the value ofm is different from zero,
on the other hand, while waiting for the termination of Pnm , in correspondence of the value 0 of m, any
other action is accepted by the formula
2 = [pushstack, =null] 〈mod(r), =1〉tt.
2 means that whenever the program starts by inserting an element in an empty stack, then a suc-
cessive instruction modifying r can be performed with the value of the top element of the stack equal
to 1.
3. The model
The ﬁrst sub-section below describes the construction of the program control-ﬂow graph that represents
the precedence relations among the instructions of a JVML program. The second sub-section contains the
description of the memory and stack representations, together with the transition relation from state to
state, which constitutes the symbolic execution environment for JVML programs. The model, described
in the ﬁnal sub-section, is composed of the control-ﬂow graph and of the symbolic execution environment:
in such way the model can be checked both for dynamic properties over data and for static properties
over control information.
3.1. The program control-ﬂow graph construction
Given a setA,A denotes the set of ﬁnite sequences of elements ofA;  indicates the empty sequence;
if w is a ﬁnite sequence, w denotes the length of w, i.e. the number of elements of w; · denotes both
the concatenation of a value to a sequence and the standard concatenation operation between sequences,
i.e. if w, u ∈ A and k ∈ A, k · w is the sequence obtained prepending k to w, and w · u is obtained
by appending u to w; ﬁnally, if i ∈ {1, . . . , w}, with w[i] we denote the ith element of w, i.e. if
w = w1 · · ·wn,w[i] = wi . A program P is a sequence c of instructions, numbered starting from address
1; ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, c[i] is the instruction at address i.
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Table 2
Control-ﬂow graph rules
halt c[i] = halt
〈i, s〉 halt−→ 〈c + 1, s〉
goto c[i] = goto j
〈i, s〉 goto j−→ 〈j, s〉
jsr c[i] = jsr j
〈i, s〉 jsr j−→ 〈j, (i + 1) · s〉
ret c[i] = ret x
〈i, r · s〉 ret x−→ 〈r, s〉
seq c[i] ∈ {op, pop, push k, load x, store x}
〈i, s〉 c[i]−→〈i + 1, s〉
if c[i] = if j
〈i, s〉 ifff−→ 〈i + 1, s〉 〈i, s〉 iftt−→ 〈j, s〉
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Control-ﬂow graph). Consider a program P . The control-ﬂow graph of P is the tuple
(S, T ,−→, 〈a0, 〉), where
• S ⊆ A×A is the set of the states, and A is the domain of the addresses.
• T is the set of transitions: it is composed of each instruction of the program different from the if
instruction, plus the two transitions ifff and iftt.
• −→ ⊆ S × T × S, is the transition relation which models the control-ﬂow of a program and is the
least relation deﬁned by the rules in Table 2.
• 〈a0, 〉 ∈ S is the initial state (corresponding to the instruction with label 1 in P and to the empty
stack).
It is worth noting that, in the rules in Table 2, for each state 〈a, s〉 ∈ S, s represents the abstraction of the
operand stack which keeps addresses only. In fact, to perform the graph construction, we use a simpliﬁed
copy of the operand stack that is discarded in the veriﬁcation phase. This stack keeps only addresses that
are pushed by jsr and popped by ret x, even if, during the normal execution of a JVML program, the
instruction ret x takes the return address from the local variable x; the two behaviors of ret x are
equivalent, since, as said in the previous section, we suppose that the instructions representing subroutine
calls derive from the compilation of higher level JAVA constructs, and thus an instruction store x is
always put as the ﬁrst instruction of the subroutine body. Consequently, jsr instructions insert addresses
in s as in the operand stack, while ret x instructions eliminate the top element of s that is supposed
equal to the value of x.
3.2. The symbolic execution environment
In this section we present our concept of symbolic execution environment of a program: each state is
deﬁned in terms of an enriched memory view and an enriched stack view. Given a JVML program P ,
VarP and ConstP are the sets of the local variables and the local constants of P , respectively; C⊥ is the
set ConstP ∪⊥, where⊥ is an abstraction for all the undeﬁned values. Consequently, given an arithmetic
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operation op, k1 op k2 denotes its abstract result:
k1 op k2 =
{⊥ if k1 = ⊥ or k2 = ⊥,
k1 op k2 otherwise
3.2.1. Enriched memory
Sets of pairs 〈variable, value〉 are usually sufﬁcient to deﬁne memories, here, to be able to perform
computations also in presence of unknown values, we use the notion of enriched memory. The view of
an enriched memory at execution point j is given by a sub-set of the triples of the form
〈variablename, value, condition〉
where value ∈ C⊥ and condition is the constraint (either a guard or tt) that the value of the variable
variablename has to satisfy at the execution point j ; obviously, a condition is of interest only if value =
⊥. For example, the triple 〈x, ⊥, x > 7〉 means that the value of the variable x at this point is unknown
but it is required to be greater than 7.
Conditions contained in the enriched memory, as well as in the enriched stack, are generally expressed
by conjunctions of guards and represent the program requirements.We disregard here a discussion on the
way in which the guards are obtained during the symbolic execution, we only say what is the condition
initially associated with each variable, and deﬁne how the conditions take account of guards to obtain a
newmemory (and stack) view.A possible way inwhich guards are obtainedwill be shown in the following
section.
3.2.2. Enriched stack
Stacks are usually deﬁned as ﬁnite sequences of elements in some domain, i.e., a possible stack is the
sequence k · k1 · · ·, where k is the top element. Here we use enriched stacks whose view at execution
point j is given by a sequence of couples of the form
〈value, condition〉
where value ∈ C⊥ and condition is the constraint (either a guard or tt) stated on the value of a local
variable when that value was pushed onto the stack. Whenever a constant is pushed onto the stack,
condition is set to tt.
Some operators need to work on  and 	: for the sake of simplicity, we shall omit the operands  or
	 when deﬁning the operators val and cond; moreover, we use a same name for each operator instead
of distinguishing, for instance, the operator val from the operator val	 on the basis of the type of its
operands.
Suppose the memory view  containing the triple 〈x, k, c〉:
• val(x) denotes the value of x in , i.e. k,
• cond(x) denotes the condition which binds the value of x in , i.e. c. If x is obtained from var(g), for
some guard g, and var(g) = nil, we assume cond(var(g)) = tt.
• [k′/val(x)] indicates that all elements of  are unchanged except val(x) which becomes equal to k′,
while;
• [c′/cond(x)] indicates that cond(x) assumes the value c′ while all the other elements of  are
unchanged. Moreover, by [c/cond(x)][c′/cond(x′)] we mean that, ﬁrst c replaces the condition
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Table 3
→
trans ∈ {ret x,load x,jsr j,goto j, push k,pop,halt,op,iftt,ifff}
〈, 	〉 trans,a,g→  [g ∧ cond(var(g))/cond(var(g))]
〈, 〈k, c〉 · 	〉 store x,a,g→  [k/val(x)] [c[x/]/cond(x)] [g ∧ cond(var(g))/cond(var(g))]
associated with x, and then, c′ replaces the condition associated with x′. If var(g) = nil and c
indicates a generic condition, [c/cond(var(g))] does not modify the memory.
Suppose the stack view 	 having  as top element:
• val() denotes the value k, if the pair 〈k, c〉 is the top element of 	. If 	 = , val() = null.
• cond() denotes the condition which constrains the value of the top element of 	, i.e. c. If 	 = , we
assume cond() = tt.
Finally, given a generic condition c,
• c[z/x] indicates the transformation of each guard in c of the form x rop k (¬(x rop k) ) into z rop k
(¬(z rop k)), with z ∈ { ∪ ConstP ∪ VarP } and x ∈ { ∪ VarP }.
Now, we are ready to deﬁne the symbolic execution environment of P , called E(P ).
Deﬁnition 3.2 (E(P )). Consider a JVML program P with control-ﬂow graph (S, T ,−→, 〈a0, 〉). E(P )
is the tuple (SE , TE , →, 
0), where:
• SE ⊆M×  is the domain of the states, whereM is the domain of the enriched memory views and
 is the domain of the enriched stack views;
• TE ⊆ T ×A×G is the set of transitions, whereA is the domain of addresses in S and G is the domain
of the guards;
• → ⊆ SE ×TE ×SE is the transition relation which models the state evolution. It holds that 〈, 	〉 ,a,g→
〈′, 	′〉 if 〈, 	〉 ,a,g→  ′ and 〈′, 	〉 ,a,g→ 	 	′, where → and →	, inductively deﬁned on , are shown
in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
• 
0 = 〈0, 	0〉 ∈ SE is the initial state, where
0 = {〈x,⊥, tt〉 | x ∈ VarP }, 	0 = .
In Deﬁnition 3.2, each local variable is undeﬁned in the initial state of E(P ) and no constraint binds
it; moreover, the property veriﬁcation is carried on starting from an empty stack, i.e. for any stack
conﬁguration.
Table 3 shows how the enrichedmemory changes after the performance, at address a, of a transitionwith
guard g. Suppose the guard g involves the local variable y (for example, g = (y rop k) or g = ¬(y rop k)).
The effect of → on the state of the enriched memory is the following: each possible transition adds g to
cond(y); in this way g helps to perform the symbolic computation and to reﬁne the possibly unknown
value of y. The transition store x produces a more complex effect: ﬁrst val(x) is replaced by val()
and cond(x) by cond() (after having substituted the name  with x); then cond(y) is reﬁned by g, in
this way, when var(g) = x, both cond() and g reﬁne cond(x).
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Table 4
→	
In the case when trans1 ∈ {ret x,goto j,halt}
〈, 	〉 trans1,a,g→ 	 	
In the case when trans2 ∈ {store x,pop,iftt,ifff}
〈, 〈k, c〉 · 	〉 trans2,a,g→ 	 	
In the case of op
〈, 〈k1, c′〉 · 〈k2, c〉 · 	〉 op,a,g→ 	 〈k1opk2,tt〉 · 	
In the case when 	 = 〈k1, c〉 · 	′ and var(g) = nil
〈, 	〉 jsr j,a,g→ 	 〈a + 1,tt〉 · 〈k1, g ∧ c〉 · 	′
〈, 	〉 push k,a,g→ 	 〈k,tt〉 · 〈k1, g ∧ c〉 · 	′
〈, 	〉 load x,a,g→ 	 〈val(x), cond(x)[/x]〉 · 〈k1, g ∧ c〉 · 	′
In the case when 	 =  or var(g) = nil
〈, 	〉 jsr j,a,g→ 	 〈a + 1,tt〉 · 	
〈, 	〉 push k,a,g→ 	 〈k,tt〉 · 	
〈, 	〉 load x,a,g→ 	 〈val(x), cond(x)[/x]〉 · 	
Table 4 shows how the enriched stack changes after the performance, at address a, of a transition with
guard g. The transitionsret x,goto andhalt do not change the stack (recall that we aremanaging the
operand stack and this is the standard behavior of ret x). store x, pop, iftt, ifff simply discard
the top element of the stack; op discards the two top elements, and pushes onto the stack the abstract
result of the operation. The other transitions (jsr j, push k, load x) modify the stack in a way
depending on whether the guard involves a local variable or the stack top element. In the former case, jsr
j pushes a+1 with condition tt onto the stack; push k pushes the constant kwith condition tt, while
load x pushes the value and the associated condition of x (where  is substituted to any occurrence of
the name x). Note that, if var(g) = x, load x pushes onto the stack a condition that includes g (see
the rule 〈, 	〉 trans,a,g→  in Table 3). In the latter case, the transitions push a new top element onto the
stack as above, moreover add g to the condition which binds the old top element, in fact, g is veriﬁed
taking into account such element (see the following Section 4). Note that guards of the form  = null
and ¬( = null) are never present in the conditions present in a state.
Example 3.3. Suppose the state 〈, 	〉, where
 = {〈x,⊥,x>100〉, 〈y, 1,tt〉,〈z,⊥,z=0〉}
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and
	 = 〈⊥,  < 120〉 · 〈1,tt〉 · 〈⊥,  > 20〉
and the transition store x with g = x > 110.
〈, 	〉 store x,a,g→ 〈′, 	′〉, where
′ = {〈x,⊥,(x>100) ∧ (x>110) ∧ (x<120)〉, 〈y, 1,tt〉,〈z,⊥,z=0〉}
and
	′ = 〈1,tt〉 · 〈⊥,  > 20〉.
Now, suppose the transition load x with g =  > 50.
〈, 	〉 load x,a,g→ 〈, 	′′〉, where the state of the enriched memory is unchanged since var(g) = nil and
	′′ = 〈⊥, ( > 100) ∧ ( > 110) ∧ ( < 120) ∧ ( > 50)〉 · 〈1,tt〉 · 〈⊥,  > 20〉.
3.3. The model of a JVML program
Henceforth, we use the abstraction of control-ﬂow graphs deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Abstract control-ﬂow graph G(P )). Consider the control-ﬂow graph of the program P ,
(S, T ,−→, 〈a0, 〉), its abstraction is the tuple G(P ) = (A, T ,−→abs, a0), where
• the domain of states S ⊆ A × A is replaced by the simpler domain A, thus each state 〈a, s〉 is
abstracted in a;
• the transition relation −→abs is a subset of A× T ×A, such that
a
−→abs a′ if and only if 〈a, s〉 −→〈a′, s′〉.
• a0 ∈ A is the initial state if 〈a0, 〉 ∈ S is the initial state of the control-ﬂow graph.
In other words, we used a copy of the operand stack to deﬁne control-ﬂow graphs, as in [29], but this
second stack can be discarded once the graph has been obtained, and the program model is based on the
abstract graph only. For the sake of simplicity, from now on, in G(P ) we will use−→ instead of−→abs.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (The model of P ). Consider the JVML program P together with G(P ) = (A, T ,−→, a0)
and E(P ) = (SE , TE , →, 
0). The ﬁnite model which represents the dynamic behavior of a program is
the tuple (SM, TM,−→M, 〈a0, 
0〉), where:
• SM ⊆ A× SE is the set of the states;
• TM ⊆ T × G is the set of transitions, where G is the domain of the guards;
• −→M ⊆ SM × TM × SM is the transition relation which models the program behavior and is deﬁned
as follows:
〈a, 
〉 ,g−→M 〈a′, 
′〉 if and only if a −→ a′ and 
 ,a,g→ 
′
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Fig. 1. The abstract program control-ﬂow graph of Pnm .
• 〈a0, 
0〉 ∈ SM is the initial state (corresponding to the instruction with label 1 in P and to the initial
state of E(P )).
3.4. Modeling the program Pnm
Reconsider the program Pnm of Section 2.3: the abstract graph G(Pnm) is in Fig. 1, 
0 is the following
initial state of E(P )

0 = 〈0, 〉 where 0 = {〈x,⊥, tt〉 | x ∈ {r, n, m}}.
4. Property veriﬁcation
In this section, ﬁrst we deﬁne the consistency among transitions of an abstract control-ﬂow graph and
actions of the logic. Afterwards, we deﬁne when a guard is fulﬁlled by a state of E(P ), and, ﬁnally, when
a state of the model satisﬁes a formula.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Consistency among transitions and actions). Consider G(P ) = (A, T ,−→, a0) and  ∈
T . Given the action , and k ∈ ConstP ,  is consistent with  (written  ≡ ) if one of the following
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conditions holds:
 = ,
 = mod(x) and  = store x,
 = popstack and  ∈ {pop, store x, op, iftt, ifff},
 = pushstack and  ∈ {push k, load x, jsr j},
 = use(x) and  ∈ {load x, ret x}.
Intuitively, a transition is consistent with mod(x) if the corresponding instruction is able to modify
the local variable x; it is consistent with use(x) if the corresponding instruction is able to use x without
modiﬁcations. Thus ret x is an instruction that uses x since the subroutine return address is retrieved
from the variable x (see the rules in Tables 3 and 4). A transition is consistent with popstack if the
corresponding instruction cancels a value from the stack, and it is consistent with pushstack if the
corresponding instruction pushes a value onto the stack. Note that both transitions iftt and ifff are
consistent with the action popstack, since consistency is only a syntactic notion.
The following deﬁnition states, at each transition occurrence, when a guard is fulﬁlled in the state 
 of
E(P ).
Deﬁnition 4.2 (V [] , V〈〉). Consider the state 
 = 〈, 	〉, the transition  and the guard g. V〈〉(
, , g) and
V [](
, , g) are deﬁned in Table 5. {|A|} translates each sub-expression of the form x = ⊥ (and  = ⊥) into
tt, and each expression of the form c ∧ g (and c ⇒ g) with c including the sub-expression ( = null)
into c when g = ( = null), into ff otherwise; then solves the inequalities, and returns true if a solution
exists, false otherwise.
Table 5 separately considers the case when var(g) = x and when var(g) = nil. If var(g) = x,
V [](
, , g) returns true if g evaluates to true on at least a subset of the values of var(g) admitted by 
.
If var(g) = nil, V [](
, , g) returns true if g evaluates to true on at least a subset of the values of the
top value admitted by 
. In fact, g is evaluated in conjunction with the suitable conditions present in the
memory and in the stack. In both cases, V〈〉(
, , g) returns true if g always evaluates to true under 
. In
fact, g must be implied by the suitable conditions present in the memory and in the stack. Note that, in
correspondence of the action popstack, V [] and V〈〉 returns true only if the stack is non empty, and,
when the corresponding transition is ifff (iftt), also only if the top value is equal to 0 (different from 0).
In fact, in these cases, consistency is not able to guarantee that the action popstack can occur.
Many environments exist to solve inequalities (see for exampleMaple, a product of theWaterlooMaple
Software Corporation [8]). They can be used to compute both V〈〉 and V [] .








have a slight different meaning: when g is fulﬁlled, any transition not consistent with  can occur and
actions consistent with  are forbidden, while, when g is not fulﬁlled, only actions consistent with  can
occur.
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Table 5
Deﬁnition of V〈〉(
, , g) and V[](
, , g)
var(g) = x :
 ≡ popstack
V[](
, , g) = {|cond(x) ∧ x = val(x) ∧ g|}
V〈〉(
, , g) = {|cond(x) ∧ x = val(x) ⇒ g|}
 = ifff
V[](
, , g) = {|cond(x) ∧ x = val(x) ∧ cond() ∧  = val() ∧  = 0 ∧ g|}
V〈〉(
, , g) = {|(cond(x) ∧ x = val(x) ⇒ g) ∧ cond() ∧  = val() ∧  = 0|}
 = iftt
V[](
, , g) = {|cond(x) ∧ x = val(x) ∧ cond() ∧  = val() ∧  = 0 ∧  = null ∧ g|}
V〈〉(
, , g) = {|(cond(x) ∧ x = val(x) ⇒ g) ∧ cond() ∧  = val() ∧  = 0 ∧  = null|}
 ≡ popstack and  ∈ {iftt, ifff}
V[](
, , g) = {|cond(x) ∧ x = val(x) ∧  = null ∧ g|}
V〈〉(
, , g) = {|(cond(x) ∧ x = val(x) ⇒ g) ∧  = null|}
var(g) = nil :
 ≡ posptack
V[](
, , g) = {|cond() ∧  = val() ∧ g|}
V〈〉(
, , g) = {|cond() ∧  = val() ⇒ g|}
 = ifff
V[](
, , g) = {|cond() ∧  = val() ∧  = 0 ∧ g|}
V〈〉(
, , g) = {|cond() ∧  = val((() ∧  = 0 ⇒ g|}
 = iftt
V[](
, , g) = {|cond() ∧  = val() ∧  = 0 ∧  = null ∧ g|}
V〈〉(
, , g) = {|cond() ∧  = val() ∧  = 0 ∧  = null ⇒ g|}
 ≡ popstack and  ∈ {iftt, ifff}
V[](
, , g) = {|cond() ∧  = val() ∧  = null ∧ g|}
V〈〉(
, , g) = {|cond() ∧  = val() ∧  = null ⇒ g|}
Example 4.3. Suppose 〈x,⊥, x > 9〉 a triple in the enriched memory . It holds that V [](〈, 	〉,halt,
x > 11) = true, since there exists at least a value n for x such that (n > 11 ∧ n > 9) = true (i.e.
{|x > 11 ∧ x > 9|} = true). On the contrary, V〈〉(〈, 	〉,halt, x > 11) = f alse, since it is required
that for all values of x such that x > 9 it must be also x > 11 (i.e. {|x > 9 ⇒ x > 11|} = f alse).
The deﬁnition below says when a state of the model for the program P satisﬁes the formula .
Deﬁnition 4.4 (). Consider the state 〈a, 
〉 of the model (SM, TM,−→M, 〈a0, 
0〉) of the program P
and the closed formula .
〈a, 
〉-satisﬁes , denoted as 〈a, 




〉   ff
〈a, 
〉1 ∧ 2 iff 〈a, 
〉1 and 〈a, 
〉2
A. Santone, G. Vaglini / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 70 (2005) 258–281 271
〈a, 
〉1 ∨ 2 iff 〈a, 
〉1 or 〈a, 
〉2
〈a, 
〉 [, g] ′ iff ∀  ≡ .V [](
, , g) and ∀a′
〈a, 




〉〈, g〉′ iff ∃  ≡ .V〈〉(E, , g) and ∃a′.
〈a, 




〉Z. iff 〈a, 
〉Zn. for all n
〈a, 
〉Z. iff 〈a, 
〉Zn. for some n
where, for each n,
Z0. = tt Z0. = ff
Zn+1. = {Zn./Z} Zn+1. = {Zn./Z}
and the notation {/Z} indicates the substitution of  for every free occurrence of the variable Z in .
In other words, given the state a of G(P ) and the state 
 ∈ E(P ),
• [, g]  is 〈a, 
〉-satisﬁed if, whenever 〈a, 
〉 ,g−→M〈a′, 
′〉 with  consistent with , 
 fulﬁlls g and
〈a′, 
′〉-satisﬁes .
• 〈, g〉 is 〈a, 
〉-satisﬁed if it exists 〈a, 
〉 ,g−→M〈a′, 
′〉 with  consistent with , 
 fulﬁlls g and 〈a′, 
′〉-
satisﬁes .
As ﬁnal remark, we note that the value of the conditions in the initial state of E(P ), for any P , is tt;
moreover, given the formula [, g]  (or 〈, g〉), g is added to the conditions in the state 
 of E(P ) only
if 
 fulﬁlls g and does not contain conditions always false. As a result, the transition relation of E(P ) is
applied only if the new value to be held by a local variable (or becoming the new top of the stack) and
the new conditions are consistent. Consequently, whenever, for example, cond(x) ∧ x = val(x) ⇒ g,
it is superﬂuous to add g to cond(x); similarly, whenever g ⇒ cond(x)∧ x = val(x) it is sufﬁcient to
set cond(x) = g. Such simpliﬁcations can be easily performed by the symbolic executor.
To assert that a program P satisﬁes a formula , it should be proved that each computation of P (for
any set of values of the local variables) satisﬁes . Exploiting the deﬁnition of satisfaction, we prove that
if 〈a0, 
0〉 then P , starting from any memory conﬁguration, satisﬁes , where 
0 is the initial state
of E(P ) and a0 the initial state of G(P ). In other words, the abstract computations correctly model the
system behavior, but, if the proof fails, the property is not necessarily false. The lemmas and theorems
that prove the previous assertions are in the appendix.
4.1. Properties of the program Pnm
Reconsider the property 2 = [pushstack, =null] 〈mod(r), =1 〉tt and the program Pnm
of Section 2.3: we show that its model, deﬁned in Section 3.4, satisﬁes 2.
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〈1, 
0〉 [pushstack,  = null] 〈mod(r), =1〉tt since:
〈1, 
0〉 push 1,=null−→ M 〈2, 
1〉;
push 1 and pushstack are consistent;
V [](
0,push 1,  = null) is true; and
〈2, 
1〉〈mod(r), =1〉tt, with 
1 = 〈0, 〈1〉,tt〉.
In fact,
V [](




1〉 store,=1−→ M 〈3, 
2〉;
store r and mod(r) are consistent;
V〈〉(
1,store r,  = 1) is true, since {|tt ∧  = 1⇒  = 1|} has a solution.
Obviously 〈3, 
2〉tt, with 
2 = 〈1, 〉, and 1 = {〈x,⊥, tt〉 | x ∈ {n, m}} ∪ {〈r, 1, tt〉}.
5. The model checking procedure
5.1. The tableau proof system
To provide a technique for the automatic veriﬁcation of properties, we develop a tableau proof system,
similar to that for mu-calculus [30]. Given a program P , a proof is built from sequents of the form
〈a, 
〉G where:
• G is the abstract control-ﬂow graph of P , a ∈ A, and A is the set of the states of G,
•  is a GAL formula,
• 
 is a state, and
•  is a sequence of declarations U1 = 1, . . . , Un = n, such that Ui = Uj , if i = j and such that
each constant occurring in i is one of U1, . . . , Ui−1. The operation  ◦ (U = ) is deﬁned to append
the declaration U =  to the deﬁnition list .




〉1 · · · 〈an, 
〉n
with n > 0 and, possibly, side conditions. The premise sequent is the goal to be achieved, the consequents
are the sub-goals which are determined by the structure of the formula, by the state 
 and by the states of
G(P ).
Table 6 shows the rules for our tableau system: given a formula  and a program P , with initial address
a, the initial goal is a sequent of the form: 〈a, 
0〉, where 
0 is the initial state. To check if P has
the property , one has to build a tableau, i.e., a proof tree whose root is labeled with the initial goal.
Sequents labeling the immediate successors of a node are determined by the application of one of the rules
in Table 6 or and and rules are straightforward. New constants are introduced when ﬁx-points are met




〉 [, g] 
〈a1, 
1〉 · · · 〈an, 
n〉
{(a1, 
1), . . . , (an, 
n)} =
{(a′, 
′) | 〈a, 
〉 ,g−→M 〈a′, 







1) ∈ {(a′, 
′) | 〈a, 
〉 ,g−→M 〈a′, 
























U = 	Z. ∈ 
(rule ﬁx-point) and then these are unfolded by rule unfold, where we assume that 	 ranges over {, }.
The modal rules (box and diamond) are an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of satisfaction. We
assume that the rules in Table 6 only apply to nodes which are not terminals. A node n, labeled with the
sequent 〈t, 
〉, where 
 = 〈, 	〉, is terminal, if one of the following conditions holds:
Successful
1.  = tt
2.  = [, g]  and the set {〈a′, 
′〉|〈t, 
〉 ,g−→M 〈a′, 
′〉,  ≡ ,V [](
, , g)} = ∅
3.  = U , U = Z. and there is a node above n labeled by 〈t, 
〉.
Unsuccessful
i.  = ff
ii.  = 〈, g〉 and the set {〈a′, 
′〉|〈t, 
〉 ,g−→M 〈a′, 
′〉,  ≡ ,V〈〉(
, , g)} = ∅
iii.  = U , U = Z. and there is a node above n labeled by 〈t, 
〉.
A node fulﬁlling conditions 1, 2 or 3 is said to be a successful terminal, whereas a node fulﬁlling
conditions i, ii or iii is unsuccessful. A successful tableau for 〈a, 
〉 is a ﬁnite proof tree whose root
is labeled with 〈a, 
〉 and all leaves are successful. Note that 〈a, 
〉 may have many associated
tableaux; if a successful tableau for 〈a, 
〉 exists then a has the property . The rules that permit
choice are diamond and or rules.
The tableau proof system presented can be proved sound, and complete only for terminating programs.
The related theorem can be found in [27]. To deal also with non-terminating programs we can take into
account the work proposed in [5].
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Table 7







0〉[−halt, m = 0]U ∧ [halt, m = 0]ff
〈1, 
0〉[−halt, m = 0]U 〈1, 




1〉[−halt, m = 0]U ∧ [halt, m = 0]ff
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
5.2. The model checking procedure applied to Pnm
Given the program Pnm and the formula 1 = Z.[halt, m = 0]ff∧[−halt, m = 0]Z of Section
2.3, a partial successful tableau is shown in Table 7, where it holds that:
 = U = Z.[halt, m = 0]ff ∧ [−halt, m = 0]Z,

0 = 〈0, 〉,
where
0 = {〈r,⊥,tt〉} ∪ {〈n,⊥,tt〉} ∪ {〈m,⊥,tt〉},

1 = 〈0, 〈1,tt〉〉.
When completing the tableau a terminal sequent 〈3, 
′〉U (with a same sequent above it) can be easily,
but tediously, found, where 




6. Related works and conclusions
Several works can be found in the recent literature aiming to verify real programs written in modern
languages. As stated in [32], they can be roughly divided into two categories: source-to-source trans-
lators and custom-made model checkers. The works belonging to the ﬁrst category (see, for example,
[12,14,17,21]), translate programs to the input languages of veriﬁcation tools. For example, in [12], Java
source code, after some manipulation, is translated to either Promela, the input notation of Spin [20], or
the SMV [24] model checker’s input notation. Source-to-source translation suffers from some drawbacks:
language coverage, i.e., each language feature of the source language must have a “counterpart’’ in the
destination language; and source required, i.e., the original source is required in order to translate one
source to another one. Alternatively, custom-made model checkers can be designed, see for example
[32] where a veriﬁcation and testing environment for Java, Java PathFinder (JPF), has been developed.
A. Santone, G. Vaglini / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 70 (2005) 258–281 275
However, the model checker of JPF can only check for deadlocks and user-deﬁned assertions in the code;
no temporal model checking exists.
Other interesting complete environments for checking programs are:
• the SLAM toolkit [1,2] checks safety properties of software without the need for user-supplied annota-
tions or abstractions. Given a safety property to check on a C program P , the SLAM process iteratively
reﬁnes a boolean program abstraction of P using a predicate abstraction tool that abstract P into a
boolean program with respect to a set of predicates over P ; then a suitable tool model checks such
boolean program;
• BLAST [18,19], a model checker for C programs, which uses counterexample-driven automatic ab-
straction reﬁnement to construct an abstract model to be model checked for safety properties;
• the Bandera tools [12,16], that use temporal patterns, to be instantiated to formulae in temporal logics,
to specify properties and use program slicing and data abstraction (abstract interpretation) to customize
models. In this case the abstraction is driven by the formula.
Finally, an approach based on symbolic execution can be found in [11], where conditions (constraints)
on the variables are derived from the particular execution path followed. In [22] a veriﬁcation framework
based on symbolic execution and model checking has been developed too. The framework is on top of the
Java PathFinder model checker and it was used to verify Java programs. The limitation of this framework
is that it could not be used for proving properties of programs containing loops. This limitation has been
removed in [26]. The techniques proposed in [22,26] handles different types of data (i.e. dynamically
allocated structures and arrays, etc.), but they allow for checking only quantiﬁer-free boolean formulae
and the program must be instrumented.
In this paper, although we have considered a simple language, we propose a model checking algorithm
which can be easily automatized and is formally deﬁned. A temporal action logic is deﬁned too, which
permits the introduction of conditions to constrain the value of the local variables. Data abstractions
are made by introducing the constant ⊥ that represents unknown values; these values are reﬁned during
the execution on the basis of the guards in the formula to be veriﬁed. Thus the abstraction is formula-
driven, and the approach is more ﬂexible than, for example, approaches based on predicate abstraction
[13]. Moreover, our approach permits to check arbitrary formulae (not just universal properties) as, for
example, generalized model-checking [15], even if the answer of the check is less precise. Nevertheless,
more precision can be gained by a careful use of the guards in the formula, and a more accurate treatment
of the conditions kept in the symbolic execution environment, for example after the occurrence of an op
instruction. The veriﬁcation is carried on by means of a symbolic executor that works on the conditions
associated with the local variables and the stack elements. This kind of execution permits to block
the number of iterations of the same set of instructions inside a loop, since the guards which can be
inserted in the conditions are only those present in the formula, and the executor performs a set of easy
simpliﬁcations each time a condition has to be modiﬁed; in this way a better execution efﬁciency is
achieved. Consequently there is no need to instrument the program by annotating loop invariants useful
to verify any formula. Moreover, the program has not to be completely executed except for the part local
to the formula veriﬁcation.
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Table 8
Semantics rules
halt c[i] = halt
〈i, m, s〉 halt!⇒ 〈c + 1,m, s〉
goto c[i] = goto j
〈i, m, s〉 goto j!⇒ 〈j,m, s〉
jsr c[i] = jsr j
〈i, m, s〉 jsr j!⇒ 〈j,m, (i + 1) · s〉
ret c[i] = ret x
〈i, m, s〉 ret x!⇒ 〈m(x),m, s〉
op c[i] = op, k = k1 op k2
〈i, m, k1 · k2 · s〉 c[i]!⇒〈i + 1, k · s〉
pop c[i] = pop
〈i, m, k · s〉 c[i]!⇒〈i + 1,m, s〉
push c[i] = push k
〈i, m, s〉 c[i]!⇒〈i + 1,m, k · s〉
load c[i] = load x, m(x) = k
〈i, m, s〉 c[i]!⇒〈i + 1,m, k · s〉
store c[i] = store x
〈i, m, k · s〉 c[i]!⇒〈i + 1,m[k/x], s〉
iff alse c[i] = if j
〈i, m, 0 · s〉 ifff!⇒ 〈i + 1,m, s〉
iftrue c[i] = if j, k = 0
〈i, m, k · s〉 iftt!⇒ 〈j,m, s〉
Appendix A. Correctness of the approach
The concrete semantics of the sub-set of JVML considered in Section 2.1, is an operational semantics
which deﬁnes a labeled transition system. Given a program P ,M = VarP −→ ConstP is the domain of
memories, ranged over by m, while S = ConstP ∗ is the domain of stacks, ranged over by s.
m[k/x] denotes the memory m′ which agrees with m on all variables apart x, for which m′(x) = k. The
states of P are a subset of Q = A ×M × S: each state is a triple 〈a,m, s〉 of an address, a memory
and a stack. Given the set T of transitions deﬁned in Section 3.1, the rules in Table 8 deﬁne the relation
!⇒ ⊆ Q× T ×Q. If (q1, , q2) ∈ !⇒, we write q1 !⇒ q2.
Given a program P and a memory m ∈ M, the concrete semantics of P is the transition system
C(P,m) = (Q,!⇒, 〈1,m, 〉), where 〈1,m, 〉) is the initial state of C(P,m) consisting of the address
of the ﬁrst instruction of P , the given memory and the empty operand stack. Since the program is
deterministic, C(P,m) has only one, possibly inﬁnite, path, also called execution path.
The following lemma states that the abstract control-ﬂow graph includes all possible execution paths
of a program.
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LemmaA.1. Let m ∈M, s ∈ S, a ∈ A and  ∈ T .
If ∃m′, s′such that〈a,m, s〉 !⇒〈a′,m′, s′〉then a −→ a′
Proof. Obvious: by deﬁnition of !⇒ and of −→. 
Now we introduce the notion of satisfaction of a GAL formula over an execution path (i.e., #).
Deﬁnition A.2 (#). Consider the state q = 〈a,m, s〉, belonging to C(P,m), and the closed formula ;
q satisﬁes , denoted as q#, if one of the following cases occurs:
q# tt
q  # ff
q#1 ∧ 2 iff q#1 and q#2
q#1 ∨ 2 iff q#1 or q#2
q# [, g] ′ iff ∀ q ′, .  ≡ . V#(q, , g). q !⇒ q ′ implies q ′#′
q#〈, g〉′ iff ∃ q ′, .  ≡ . V#(q, , g). q !⇒ q ′ and q ′#′
q#Z. iff q#Zn. for all n
q#Z. iff q#Zn. for some n
where, for each n,
Z0. = tt, Z0. = ff,
Zn+1. = {Zn./Z} Zn+1. = {Zn./Z}
and the notation {/Z} indicates the substitution of  for every free occurrence of the variable Z in .
Moreover, V#(q, , g) is deﬁned in Table 9.
We say that a program P satisﬁes a formula  if the initial state of C(P,m) satisﬁes .
Let m be a memory, s a stack and 
 a state of E(P ). The following deﬁnition says that s and m
are consistent with 
 = 〈, 	〉 if
• for each variable x, the value which x holds in m satisﬁes the condition which binds x in ;
• either the stack is empty or the top element of s satisﬁes the condition which binds the top element in
	.
Deﬁnition A.3. Consider m ∈M, s ∈ S, and the state 
 = 〈, 	〉: m and s are consistent with 
, written
(m, s)
, if it holds that:
• for each variable x, cond(x)[m(x)/x] is true; and,
• either s =  or, if s = k · s′, cond()[k/] is true.
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Table 9
Deﬁnition of V#(q, , g)
g = (x rop k) (g = ¬(x rop k)) :
 ≡ popstack
V#(q, , g) = true iff m(x) rop k is true (m(x) rop k is false)
 = iftt
V#(q, , g) = true iff m(x) rop k is true (m(x) rop k is false) and s = k · s′ with k = 0
 = ifff
V#(q, , g) = true iff m(x) rop k is true (m(x) rop k is false) and s = 0 · s′
 ≡ popstack and  ∈ {if _tt, ifff}
V#(q, , g) = true iff m(x) rop k is true (m(x) rop k is false) and s = 
g = ( rop k) (g = ¬( rop k)) :
 ∈ {iftt, ifff}
V#(q, , g) = true iff s = k′ · s′ and k′ rop k is true (k′ rop k is false)
 = iftt
V#(q, , g) = true iff s = k′ · s′ and k′ rop k is true (k′ rop k is false) and k′ = 0
 = ifff
V#(q, , g) = true iff s = k′ · s′ and k′ rop k is true (k′ rop k is false) and k′ = 0
g = ( = null) (g = ¬( = null)) :
 ≡ popstack
V#(q, , g) = true iff s =  ( s =  )
 = iftt
V#(q, , g) = false (V#(q, , g) = true iff s = k · s′, and k = 0)
 = ifff
V#(q, , g) = false (V#(q, , g) = true iff s = 0 · s′)
 ≡ popstack,  ∈ {iftt, ifff}
V#(q, , g) = false (V#(q, , g) = true iff s = )
The following lemma shows the relation among V#, and V [] and V〈〉 .
LemmaA.4. Consider m ∈ M, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and the state 
 such that (m, s)
. Given the guard g
and the transition , it holds that
V#(〈a,m, s〉, , g) = true implies both V〈〉(
, , g) = true and V [](
, , g) = true.
Proof. By Deﬁnition A.3 and by deﬁnitions of V#, V〈〉 and V [] . 
The lemma below states that, whenever a transition is performed in the state 〈a,m, s〉 of an execution
path, then producing a new memory m′ and a new stack s′, if (m, s) is consistent with 〈, 	〉, the same
transition can be performed in the state a of a control-ﬂow graph and 〈, 	〉 of E(P ), and produces a new
state 〈′, 	′〉 such that the consistency is preserved.
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LemmaA.5. Given m ∈ M, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, consider a 
 ∈ E(P ) such that (m, s)
, and a guard g
such that V#(〈a,m, s〉, , g) = true:






Proof. By Deﬁnition A.3 and by Lemma A.1. 
The following lemma states that, starting from a memory and a stack consistent with a state of E(P ), if
an execution path does not satisfy a formula, then also our abstract model does not satisfy that formula.
LemmaA.6. Considerm ∈M, s ∈ S, a ∈ A: given 
 ∈ E(P ) such that (m, s)
 and the formula , it
holds that
〈a,m, s〉  # implies that 〈a, 
〉  .
Proof. The lemma is proved by induction on the structure of the formula.
Base step: tt, ff: straightforward.
Inductive step: Let us assume that the lemma holds for .
 = [, g] ′
〈a,m, s〉  #
implies, by deﬁnition of #
∃a′, s′,m′,  such that 〈a,m, s〉 !⇒〈a′,m′, s′〉,  ≡ , V#(〈a,m, s〉, , g) is true and 〈a′,m′, s′〉
 #′.
implies, by Lemma A.5
〈a, 
〉 ,g−→M 〈a′, 
′〉 and m′
′
implies, by Lemma A.4 and Deﬁnition A.3
 ≡  and V [](
, , g) is true.
implies, by deﬁnition of  and by inductive hypothesis
〈a, 
〉  
 = 〈, g〉′: similar to the previous case.
 = 1 ∧ 2,  = 1 ∨ 2: straightforward by inductive hypothesis.
 = Z.′,  = Z.′: the thesis follows since the truth value of such formulae corresponds to the
∨/∧ of an enumerable set of ﬁnite non-recursive formulae. In fact, the programs we deal with are ﬁnite
and ﬁnitely branching.
TheoremA.7. Given a program P and a formula ,
〈a, 
〉 implies ∀m C(P,m) #
where a is the initial state of G(P ) and 
 is the initial state of E(P ).
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Proof. The theorem is an immediate consequence of the Lemma A.6, since every memory m ∈M and
every stack s ∈ S is consistent with the initial state 
.
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